This book explores how philosophical realisms relate to psychoanalytical conceptions of the Real, and in turn how the Lacanian framework challenges basic philosophical notions of object and reality. The author examines how contemporary psychoanalysis might respond to the question of ontology by taking advantage of the recent revitalization of realism in its speculative form. While the philosophical side of the debate makes a plea for an independent ontological consistency of the Real, this book proposes a Lacanian reassessment of the definition (...) of the Real as ‘what is foreign to subjectivity itself’. In doing so, it reframes the question of the Real in terms of what is already there beneath the supposedly linguistic constitution of subjectivity. The book then goes on to engage the problem of cognition in the realm of Nature qua materiality, focusing on the centrality of the body as a linguistic-material hybrid. It argues that it is possible to re-establish the theoretical dignity of Ricoeur’s notion of ‘suspicion’, by building a dialogue between Lacanian psychoanalysis and three main domains of inquiry: desire, objects and bodily enjoyment. Borrowing from Piera Aulagnier’s theory of the Other as a word-bearer, it considers the genesis of desire and sense of reality both explainable through a hybrid framework which comprises psychoanalytical insights and material dynamics in a comprehensive account. This created theoretical space is an opportunity for both philosophers and psychoanalysts to rethink key Lacanian insights in light of the problem of the Real. (shrink)

This article attempts to outline some critical aspects of the accelerationist movement. More specifically, it argues that light can be shed on key aspects of the political proposals of Williams and Srnicek by considering them from the perspective of the socio-political reflections of both Lacan and Deleuze and Guattari. Anti-Oedipus is one crucial starting point for accelerationist thinking, in terms of the concept of the ‘machinic’ and the explicit reference to ‘acceleration’, but it is equally obvious that Lacan has been (...) an important figure in the debate on the topic of ‘desire’. Likewise, and for the same reasons, accelerationism offers the potential for a fruitful reconsideration of Deleuzian philosophy, and of the difficult relationship between schizo- analysis and psycho-analysis. We argue that, in the light of accelerationism, the perspectives of Deleuze and Guattari and Lacan do converge, in particular around the theoretical articulation of the concept of the ‘political’. Accelerationism, as many critics have noted, has numerous implications in the field of subjectivity and often falls into a general plea for a strong neo-Enlightenment. Hence we will attempt to explicate these implications by attempting to read accelerationism via the psychoanalytic categories of jouissance and fantasy. This last category, as Stavrakakis has shown, is directly linked to the political category of ‘Utopia’, and therefore provides an adequate theoretical basis for such a psychoanalytic reading of accelerationism. Should accelerationism be considered the only way out of the socio-political constraints of neoliberalism today? However we approach this question, the argument pursued here is that the best starting points for a critique of accelerationism are the concepts of jouissance, the state/capital relationship, schizo-analysis and paranoid ways of functioning. (shrink)

Le contrôle de constitutionnalité, dont la magistrature parlementaire de l’Ancien Régime revendiquait le plein droit, n’était pas fondé uniquement sur les lois fondamentales du royaume, mais sur l’ensemble des principes (« les maximes ») tirés de la « Tradition ». Cette dernière était composée en premier lieu par le droit divin et le droit naturel, c’est-à-dire par des systèmes juridiques qui nécessitaient, tous les deux, une interprétation juridictionnelle ‘sapientiale’. Cette activité interprétative était ‘révélatrice’ d’un corpus de valeurs métaphysiques à laquelle (...) seule la Scientia Juris des magistrats pouvait puiser. Mais dans la sphère de la Tradition juridique rentraient aussi le « dépôt légal », c’est-à-dire l’ensemble de toutes les lois, même des lois ainsi dites « ordinaires », c’est-à-dire celles qui avaient été produites par la simple manifestation de volonté souveraine d’un roi prédécesseur « car tel avait été son plaisir » (moderne formulation du brocarde de droit romain : « quidquid principi placuit legis habet vigorem »). Ainsi la juridiction parlementaire donnait lieu à un jugement de constitutionnalité qui était normalement exercé de manière très flexible par le corps de la magistrature, dépendant des circonstances et des intérêts politiques momentanés des situations juridiques qu’elle voulait protéger. La hiérarchie des normes était ainsi un formidable instrument de protection de cet ordre juridique dont les legum doctores se sentaient les tuteurs. Elle était, donc, directement liée au gouvernement politique des juges. (shrink)

La storia medievale della teologia e della metafisica è attraversata da una rilevante discussione a proposito della predicazione della nozione di ente. I modelli più spesso evocati a tal fine sono stati, com’è noto, l’analogia e l’univocità. Rispetto a questa alternativa, la tendenza generale degli interpreti è stata quella di intendere l’univocità e l’analogia come regimi predicativi opposti o contraddittori. Questa tesi ha dato vita a una sorta di opinione comune e diffusamente condivisa. La verità di questa tesi, tuttavia, non (...) si è mai imposta in maniera definitiva: il primo dibattito sulla compatibilità dell’univocità e dell’analogia risale proprio al Medioevo. A tal proposito appare decisivo il contributo di Pietro di Tommaso (Pere Tomàs, Pietro Tomàs, Petrus Thomae): la settima delle sue Quaestiones de ente (ca. 1325) chiede infatti Utrum vera analogia et vera univocatio possint se compati in eodem conceptu. Il presente contributo cerca di riscostruire gli snodi principali dell’argomentazione che Pietro di Tommaso elabora in questo testo con la duplice finalità di valorizzare il contributo di questo autore nel quadro del dibattito teologico medievale e di giustificare l’opportunità delle ricerche che tentano oggi di ripensare il rapporto tra l’univocità e l’analogia nel pensiero scotista. The history of medieval theology and metaphysics is marked by a relevant discussion about the predication of being. The semantic devices most frequently referred to in this regard were, as is well known, analogy and univocity. With respect to this alternative, the general tendency of scholars has been to understand univocity and analogy as opposite and contradictory modes of predication. This view has led to a kind of common and widely shared opinion. This thesis, however, has never prevailed conclusively: a debate on whether univocity and analogy were compatible dates back to the Middle Ages. In this respect, the contribution of Petrus Thomae is decisive: the seventh of his Quaestiones de ente (ca. 1325) asks in fact Utrum vera analogia et vera univocatio possint se compati in eodem conceptu. This contribution tries to reconstruct the main points of Petrus Thomae’s argumentation with the twofold purpose of enhancing the contribution of this author in the framework of the medieval theological debate and of justifying the opportunity of the current research that tries to rethink the relationship between univocity and analogy in the context of Duns Scotus’ thought. (shrink)

Popper’s theory of World 3 is often regarded as incongruent with his defense of methodological individualism. This article criticizes this widespread view. Methodological individualism is said to be at odds with three crucial assumptions of the theory of World 3: the impossibility of reducing World 3 to subjective mental states because it exists objectively, the view that the mental functions cannot be explained by assuming that individuals are isolated atoms, and the idea that World 3 has causal power and influences (...) both individual minds and actions. This article demonstrates that the inconsistency thesis stems from a confusion between methodological individualism as understood by Popper and reductionism. The reasons for this confusion are analyzed and clarified. It is argued that two variants of methodological individualism can be distinguished, and that unlike psychologistic individualism, Popper’s nonatomistic individualism is fully consistent with his theory of World 3. (shrink)

The Timaeus is the dialogue that was for many centuries the most influential of Plato’s works. Among its readers we find Descartes, Boyle, Kepler and Heisenberg. In the first division of Timaeus Plato deals with the theory of celestial motion, in the second he presents us with the first mathematical theory of the structure of matter. Here, in a gigantic step forward with respect to the preceding Democritean atomistic theory with its unalterable micro-entities, he introduces the intertransformability of elementary corpuscles (...) and with that the first “chemical” reactions in history. Plato’s geometrical interpretation of Empedocles’ elements and his geometrical atomism is described at the molecular, atomic and sub-atomic level. The “chemical” reactions reported in Timaeus are written in the enlightening chemical symbolism, analogies with modern chemistry are noticed throughout. (shrink)

Recent developments in the neuroscience offer an increasing amount of “brain-based” explanations of decision-making in ethics . Are those explanations more basic than the psychological, “social” or philosophical ones? In my paper I address this question analyzing the meaning of “because” in sentences like “when someone is willing to act on a moral belief, it is because the emotional part of his or her brain has become active when considering the moral question at hand” . My answer is a pluralistic (...) one. I reject brain-fundamentalism and I argue that neuroscientific developments support a moderate form of naturalism, according to which empirical results may indirectly influence moral reflection, but offer no direct evidence to radical reductive naturalism. (shrink)

Objective Apeiron was founded in 1966 and has developed into one of the oldest and most distinguished journals dedicated to the study of ancient philosophy, ancient science, and, in particular, of problems that concern both fields. Apeiron is committed to publishing high-quality research papers in these areas of ancient Greco-Roman intellectual history; it also welcomes submission of articles dealing with the reception of ancient philosophical and scientific ideas in the later western tradition. The journal appears quarterly. Articles are peer-reviewed on (...) a double-blind basis. Topics ancient philosophy ancient science reception of ancient philosophical and scientific ideas in the later western tradition Article formats Original Articles. (shrink)

Starting from the discussion on the original set of criteria advanced by Clark and Chalmers (1998) meant to avoid the overextension of the mind, or the so-called “cognitive bloat”, we will sketch our solution to the problem of criteria evaluation, by connecting it to the search for a mark of the mental. Our proposal is to argue for a “weak conscientialist” mark of the mental based on transparent access, which vindicates the role of consciousness in defining what is mental without, (...) however, identifying the mental with the conscious. This renovated link between mind and consciousness, spelled out through the concept of transparency, further develops some of our previous work on the topic (Di Francesco 2007; Di Francesco and Piredda 2012) and is partially inspired by Horgan and Kriegel (2008). (shrink)

L’architettura fin dalle origini è stata un’arte ancipite tra utile e bello. Nel corso del tempo tale declinazione si è variamente alternata, approdando da un lato alle derivazioni funzionaliste, propugnate in varia misura dai teorici del Movimento Moderno, dall’altro, in casi estremi, a quelle forme di architettura/scultura in cui la destinazione d’uso si annulla nell’esperienza estetica. Questo numero della “Rivista di estetica” vuole fare il punto sullo stato attuale del dibattito, mettend...

In this book we offer a theory of the self, whose core ideas are that the self is a process of self-representing, and this process aims mainly at defending the self-conscious subject against the threat of its metaphysical inconsistence. In other words, the self is essentially a repertoire of psychological manoeuvres whose outcome is a self-representation aimed at coping with the fundamental fragility of the human subject. Our picture of the self differs from both the idealist and the eliminative approaches (...) widely represented in contemporary discussion. Against the idealist approach, we deny that the self is something primitive and logically prior. Rather, we take it to be the result of a process of construction that starts with subpersonal unconscious processes. On the other hand, we also reject the anti-realistic, eliminative argument that, from the non-primary, derivative nature of the self, infers its status as an illusory by-product of real neurobiological events, devoid of any explanatory role. (shrink)

Building on the literature on hybrid organizations, this manuscript explores the relationship between the organizational activity of social enterprises backed by venture philanthropy investors and income inequality. Using Ashoka’s portfolio of Indian social enterprises as empirical context of Western venture philanthropy investing activity, our results suggest that Indian municipalities with social enterprises that have received venture philanthropy investments experience a decrease in income inequality level and when these social enterprises are dominated by a collectivistic organizational identity orientation the effect is (...) stronger. Our findings have implications for the research on hybrid organizations, financing of social entrepreneurship and grand ethical challenges. (shrink)

Recent development of cognitive neuroscience shows the increasing capacity to propose neurobiological accounts of social cognition. Much research in fields such as neuroeconomics, neuroethics and neuroesthetics offers “brain-based” explanations of behaviour. But what is a “brain-based” explanation? And what is its relation with higher-level explanations? We may call “neurobiological fundamentalism” the thesis that the neural level is epistemologically fundamental – and that the higher-level explanations supplied by the special sciences such as psychology, are derivative. In this context, the main aim (...) of the present paper is to criticize neurobiological fundamentalism and to offer an alternative account based on explicative pluralism, a perspective that emphasizes the plurality of concepts, methods and evidential resources that characterise contemporary science of the mind. (shrink)

Some philosophers and cognitive scientists think that a naturalised philosophy of the (self-) conscious mind should lead us to reject the very existence of the self. The paper focuses on two case-studies which are representative of this kind of attitude. In particular we examine, and criticise, Thomas Metzinger's 'no-self alternative' and Daniel Dennett's narrative elimination of the self. Our aim is not to prove that any elimination of the self from the inventory of the world based on the empirical study (...) of the mind is doomed to failure. Instead, we would like to introduce a note of caution: it is far from clear that cognitive science and naturalistic philosophies of mind force upon us, or even suggest, a picture of the world without persons and selves. (shrink)

Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Volume 52, Issue 4, Page 207-234, July 2022. According to Searle’s theory of collective intentionality, the fundamental structure of any society can be accounted for in terms of cooperative mechanisms that create deontic relations. This paper criticizes Searle’s standpoint on the ground that, while his social ontology can make sense of simple systems of interaction like symphony orchestras and football teams, the whole coordinative structure of the modern market society cannot be explained solely in terms (...) of we-intentional collaboration and deontic relations. As clarified by Hayek, because of its complexity, this society is a self-organizing system. It results not only from micro-level agreed constraints, but also from an unintended cybernetic mechanism that affects and shapes both its micro and macro dynamics via a circular causality. Searle ignores the coordination problem posed by complexity and provides strawman arguments against the theory of action underpinning the invisible hand explanation of social phenomena. (shrink)

The right to ‘domestic remedies’, which ideally connects ‘subsidiarity’ and ‘embeddedness’ of the ECHR in the legal systems of member States, is deemed to play a crucial role for the Strasbourg machinery survival as well as for an effective protection of human rights, especially in the field of the ‘reasonable-time’ requirement. In this respect the Italian case seems an excellent test. Once a compensatory remedy was introduced in the Italian legal system by Law No. 80 of 2001 (the ‘Pinto Act’), (...) it soon appeared that such a remedy could be considered ‘effective’ in so far as it was implemented in accordance with the ECtHR’s jurisprudence. Therefore a legal tool for the interaction between ECtHR and Italian courts had to be found. Nevertheless, the results of this interaction might suggest that the domestic remedy has neither increased the protection of the reasonable-time requirement in Italy nor is it the final solution to the ECtHR’s overload. (shrink)

This commentary focuses on three aspects of Sandro Nannini’s paper Time and Consciusness in Cognitive Naturalism: the parallel between Einstein’s theory of relativity and the new science of the mind/brain; the Cartesian characterization of non-reductionist positions in the philosophy of mind; the alleged illusory status of consciousness, free will and the Self. We suggest, first, that Nannini overstates the success of cognitive neuroscience; second, that non-reductionism is not necessarily a Cartesian position; and third, that the neurocognitive science data do not (...) show or even suggest, that consciousness, free will and the Self are illusory phenomena. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the role and value of thought experiments concerning phenomenal consciousness. It is divided in two parts. The first part surveys the philosophical and scientific context in which many well-known thought experiments concerning the mind and consciousness have their roots. In particular it focuses on the problems left open by scientific theories about consciousness and by many attempts to reduce the mind to the physical world. The second part is a case study: it concentrates on the analysis (...) of the zombie thought experiment aiming to show how a simple and rather naive image, the zombie intuition, has originated stimulating and complex arguments, enriching our philosophical and intellectual landscape. On the whole, the paper highlights the fact that there are properly philosophical questions about the mind, philosophy not being a sort of junior partner in the collective enterprise of cognitive science. (shrink)

Examples are given of applications by Pauling, Mulliken, Marcus and G.E.Kimball of the three Pythagorian means to formulate the scales of electronegativity of the elements, to the calculations of rate constants of electron transfer cross-reactions, to the calculation of the observed rate constant as function of activation and diffusion rate constants in the case of mixed reaction-diffusion rates and to the calculation of the effective diffusion coefficient in solution of a salt AB as a whole from the diffusion coefficients of (...) the ions in which it dissociates. (shrink)

Professor Rudolph A. Marcus, recipient of the 1992 Nobel Prize in Chemistry, is a distinguished theoretical chemist. Two important theories happen to bear his name: the Rice Ramsperger Kassel Marcus theory of unimolecular reactions and the Marcus theory of electron transfer reactions. When considering Marcus’ work, one finds characteristics of it that bear striking similarity to those that can be found in the work of some famous scientists. Such characteristics appear then as common recurring patterns in the work of theoreticians. (...) Among them we find the following: the creation of new theories, driven by experiments that preceding theories were unable to explain; the use of thought experiments; the generalization and extensions from one realm of science to another; the making of predictions and the finding of new properties from correlations among series of data; the use of variational principles; the providing of different demonstrations of an equation; the introduction of new types of coordinates; the innovative capacity to use, by somehow recreating it under the pressure of the physical problem, a mathematical method previously unknown to the author; and finally, the presentation of formulations of the same theory in different mathematical and physical languages. Before discussing in some detail the above points, a brief description of Marcus’ work is first presented for the convenience of the reader. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to show that Boudon’s explanation of action in terms of “good reasons” can be philosophically enriched by merging his methodological perspective with Mises’ praxeology and Gadamer’s hermeneutics. In order to develop our goal of merging Boudon’s approach with Mises’ and Gadamer’s, we will focus on two points. The first is the identification of the invariable structure of human action. Unlike Boudon, we suggest that the best way to establish this invariable structure, which makes the (...) explanation of action possible, is not to refer to the controversial concept of “human nature,” but rather to use Mises’ praxeological analysis of the invariable logic which all actions have in common. The second point analyzed in this article is the temporal and cultural dimension of the interpretative process which individuals elaborate to develop their reasons. This point, which is related to hermeneutical philosophy and is not investigated in detail by Boudon, is largely discussed by Gadamer. In our opinion, merging Gadamer’s description of the interpretative process – a process that Gadamer calls “hermeneutical circle” – and Boudon’s sociology of “good reasons” is useful because, unlike Boudon, Gadamer clarifies the epistemological nature of the interpretative process as well as the reasons why this process – which is a trial and error process – allows us to understand the actions of people who belong to different cultures. (shrink)

In this article we explore the relationship between consciousness and the unconscious as it has taken shape within contemporary cognitive science - meaning by this term the mature cognitive science, which has fully incorporated the results of the neurosciences. In this framework we first compare the neurocognitive unconscious with the Freudian one, emphasizing the similarities and above all the differences between the two constructs. We then turn our attention to the implications of the centrality of unconscious processes in cognitive science (...) for the classical conception of the self. Our analysis will bring to light a bit of claustrophobic dialectic between an eliminative variety of naturalism and an anti-naturalistic form of hermeneutics. Hence we conclude by recommending the pursuit of a mediation between such extreme stances. (shrink)

This chapter takes the form of a discussion between the editors of this volume and Steven Lukes, one the most eminent critics of methodological individualism. The focus is on Lukes’ interpretation of methodological individualism in terms of linguistic exclusivism (i.e., naive reductionism), the multiple-realization problem, Boudon’s and Elster’s micro-foundationalist approach, ontological individualism, and the rationality of human action.

The automated identification of national implementations of European directives by text similarity techniques has shown promising preliminary results. Previous works have proposed and utilized unsupervised lexical and semantic similarity techniques based on vector space models, latent semantic analysis and topic models. However, these techniques were evaluated on a small multilingual corpus of directives and NIMs. In this paper, we utilize word and paragraph embedding models learned by shallow neural networks from a multilingual legal corpus of European directives and national legislation (...) to develop unsupervised semantic similarity systems to identify transpositions. We evaluate these models and compare their results with the previous unsupervised methods on a multilingual test corpus of 43 Directives and their corresponding NIMs. We also develop supervised machine learning models to identify transpositions and compare their performance with different feature sets. (shrink)

The automated identification of national implementations of European directives by text similarity techniques has shown promising preliminary results. Previous works have proposed and utilized unsupervised lexical and semantic similarity techniques based on vector space models, latent semantic analysis and topic models. However, these techniques were evaluated on a small multilingual corpus of directives and NIMs. In this paper, we utilize word and paragraph embedding models learned by shallow neural networks from a multilingual legal corpus of European directives and national legislation (...) to develop unsupervised semantic similarity systems to identify transpositions. We evaluate these models and compare their results with the previous unsupervised methods on a multilingual test corpus of 43 Directives and their corresponding NIMs. We also develop supervised machine learning models to identify transpositions and compare their performance with different feature sets. (shrink)